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A WARNING TO STATES-ACCEPTING THIS INVITATION
MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH (SAFETY AND
PUBLIC WELFARE): AN ANALYSIS OF POST-KELO
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION

On a warm, sunny morning in June 2005, Delaware hung up the phone,
having had a long discussion with her old friend New Jersey about liquefied
natural gas. She gazed through the large windows at the front of her house,
through the shade of a large sycamore, and over the glossy green leaves of
an American holly. Just then she noticed the postman driving away. "The
mail is finally here," she thought.
Delaware walked briskly down the driveway and threw open the small
metal door of her old-fashioned, curbside mailbox. As usual, she found
some bills, a check for highway improvements (though it was less than she
expected), and information about keeping custody of her air force base.
What she found, but had not expected, was an ornate silver envelope
adorned with bright gold ribbons. In the upper-left-hand corner was the
address of the most popular person in town, the United States Supreme
Court.
Delaware untied the ribbon and let the invitation fall open. She saw
that she was invited to a party at the Supreme Court's exclusive country
club. This was a true honor. Without so much as closing the mailbox or
cashing her highway money, Delaware jumped in her car, sped to the store,
bought new clothes and a bottle of very expensive wine as a gift, had her
hair and makeup done, and returned home to wait. All this before noon.
However, the party was not for several months, and no RSVP was due for
weeks. But Delaware was excited. She was presented with an opportunity
to impress. Not only would she accept the invitation, she would be the first
person to arrive at the party and, if anybody arrived before her, she would
make their heads turn. But perhaps she had rushed into things. Maybe she
had not thought about what the dress code would be or even if the Supreme
Court would want a bottle of wine as a gift.

Perhaps this story is a little embellished. If so, it is only to impress a
point. In June 2005, the United States did extend an invitation to all fifty
states in the form of the last paragraph of Kelo v. City of New London.' In
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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Kelo, the Court decided that economic development could constitute a
public use under the Fifth Amendment. 2 In the last paragraph of the
decision, Justice Stevens declared that the Court's ruling about the extent of
the Constitution's Public Use Clause might not be ideal for every state.
Thus, every state was free to change their statutes or constitutions in order
to offer more protections than Kelo required.3 Following this invitation, the
"reaction from states was swift and heated," with "virtually every
statehouse across the country ... advancing bills and constitutional
amendments. 'A Delaware, however, was the very first state to respond. 5 Its
response, though drastically different in content, was similar in quantum to
the response described in the story above. The intricacies of this response
are the subject of this Note.
Focusing on Delaware, this Note will argue that state legislatures have
been given an open invitation to shape their public use framework, but their
response must be measured and well-reasoned because the consequences of
reactionary legislation may put a stranglehold on state and local
governments trying to exercise eminent domain for unanimously accepted
public uses. Part I will trace the most pertinent federal jurisprudence
through Kelo. Part II will survey Delaware's public use jurisprudence. Part
III will introduce the Delaware General Assembly's legislative response to
Kelo. Part IV will serve as a warning to the states generally that many
seemingly innocuous clauses in their responsive legislation could have
substantial consequences if not carefully considered.
I. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PUBLIC USE

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,6 establishes the minimum rights
of property owners with respect to takings.7 In order to analyze the efficacy
of state legislation in response to Kelo, the jurisprudential building blocks
of eminent domain must be understood. The first building block is the
federal jurisprudence explaining the Fifth Amendment Public Use Clause
2. Id.at 490.
3. Id.at 489-90.
4. John M. Broder, States CurbingRights to Seize PrivateHomes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006,
at Al.
5. Telephone Interview with Representative Wayne Smith, House Majority Leader, Del. Gen.
Assemb., in Wilmington, Del. (Aug. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Smith Interview].
6. Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897) (holding that the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
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and articulating the boundaries of state eminent domain power. The second
block is state jurisprudence that sets forth a state's public use doctrine
within the federal guidelines. This Part surveys the first block: a trilogy of
Supreme Court cases that provides the framework of the federal public use
doctrine.
A. Berman v. Parker
Samuel Berman owned a department store located at 712 Fourth Street,
S.W. in Washington, D.C. 8 This property, unfortunately for Berman, was
located in an area of the District known to the planning commission as Area
B, so designated because in 1950 it became the subject of a massive
redevelopment plan. 9 Area B was a statutorily designated slum area. 10 A
study found that 64.3% of the structures in Area B were beyond repair,
57.8% of the buildings had no indoor toilets, 60.3% had no baths of any
kind, nearly 30% had no electricity, and the list went on."
The
redevelopment plan, which was designed to remedy these problems, had
detailed provisions for various new land uses including new low-rent
dwellings.12 The acquisition of some
properties within Area B, however,
3
required the use of eminent domain.'
Berman's property was not blighted.' 4 However, the property was
within Area B, and the comprehensive nature of the redevelopment plan
called for the razing of Berman's property.' 5 Berman objected to the
inclusion of his property in the plan.' 6 He argued that since his property
was neither residential nor blighted, the taking of his property by eminent
domain was unconstitutional.' 7 Berman further argued that, once acquired
by the city, his property would be put to private8 use, thereby violating the
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.

8. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,31 (1954).
9. Id. at 30.
10. See id. at 28 n.* (defining substandard housing conditions as those that the district
commissioners believe to be "detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of
the District of Columbia" (citing D.C. Code, § 5-702(r) (1951))).
11. Id. at 30.
12. See id. at 30-31 (noting that "at least one-third of [the dwellings] are to be low-rent
housing with a maximum rental of $17 per room per month").
13. Id.at29.
14. Id. at31.
15. See id. at 30 (describing "the judgment of the District's Director of Health [that] it was
necessary to redevelop Area B").
16. Id. at 31.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Justice Douglas, writing for the majority of the Court, began with the
assumption that "[i]t is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."' 19 With this starting
point in mind, the Court looked to the means that would be used to achieve
this legitimate end.20
The means were three-fold. First, they involved the use of eminent
domain; thus, the Court had to decide whether redevelopment constituted a
public use. 2' Second, the project would involve a taking of a non-blighted
structure, which in turn raised the question of whether taking a healthy
building was an appropriate means to achieving redevelopment. 22 Third,
the means involved the transfer of the property to a private enterprise; in
this respect, the Court was confronted with the question of whether a
private individual could be the beneficiary of a taking by eminent domain.23
In answering all three questions, the Court showed great deference to
the legislature's judgment.24 The Court first determined that redevelopment
was within the scope of public use.25 Justice Douglas reasoned that because
the goal of a healthy, clean, spacious, and well-balanced community is a
legitimate goal, "the right to realize [that goal] through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear., 26 "[T]he power of eminent domain," continued
Justice Douglas, "is merely the means to an end. 27 The practical
implication of this holding is that any time a legislative goal is legitimate,
the use of eminent domain will also be legitimate. With that, the Court
established very broad and general guidelines for the use of eminent
domain.
The Court, however, had yet to answer the remaining two questions.
To decide whether a non-blighted structure could be razed, the Court turned
to the legislative determination that a "piecemeal approach" would not lead
to an effective redevelopment project.28 In what would later prove to be
especially important reasoning, the Court agreed with the legislature that
19. Id.at 33.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.at 34 (reiterating appellant's argument that their property cannot be taken because it
is ingood condition).
23. Id. at 33.
24. Id.at 32.
25. See id. at 33 ("If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in
the way.").
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.at 34.
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[t]he entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated
plan could be developed for the region, including not only new
homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping
centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the
area could29 be controlled and the birth of future slums
prevented.
The Court decided the final question-the private ownership of the
condemned land-using the very same reasoning that it applied to the other
matters. 30 The objectives of community redevelopment and the prevention
of future slums, reasoned the Court, are within the power of the
legislature.3 Thus, an objection to private involvement must fail because
the Court "cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of
promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects. 32
Berman represents the early stages of the Supreme Court's public use
doctrine by laying out important principles. The chief principle is that
courts must show substantial deference to legislative determinations
'fegarding the use of eminent domain.33 Additionally, and perhaps more
importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Court announced that land
redevelopment is a sufficient public use for the exercise of eminent domain,
that non-blighted structures can be taken by eminent domain for the
purpose of comprehensive redevelopment, and that even when eminent
it can still be a public
domain will put land into the hands of private owners,
34
use if it serves a legitimate legislative interest.
B. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
Because the Hawaiian Islands were settled by Polynesians rather than
western Europeans, they have a much different property system than the
rest of the United States. 35 The system began as a feudal one, controlled by
one landowner who assigned parcels of his land to various subordinate
parties.3 6 This background created a unique problem on the Islands as they
began to take on more Americanized traditions and, perhaps more
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.at 34-35.
Id.at 33-34.
Id.at33.
Id.at 34.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33-35.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
Id.
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importantly, American laws. In the 1960s, 47% of all the land in the state
of Hawaii was in the hands of only seventy-two private parties. 7 This
remnant of feudalism skewed the "Americanizing" economy of Hawaii, and
thus the legislature sought ways to diversify property ownership.3 8
In 1967, the legislature passed the Land Reform Act. 39 The purpose of
the Act was to diversify land ownership by shifting title to land held in fee
simple from the current holders to those who leased land.4 ° In other words,
if the lessee of a parcel requested, the state would acquire title to that parcel
through eminent domain and then transfer ownership to the lessee. 41 The
Act seemed to work until 1979, when Frank Midkiff refused to transfer his
land for the price that was being offered and consequently filed suit,
claiming that the Act was unconstitutional.4 2
Midkiff's suit raised the question of whether the transfer of property
from lessor to lessee in order to regulate "oligopoly and the evils associated
with it" was a public use of land.43 Justice O'Connor, for the unanimous
Court, began her analysis of the Hawaii statute by reviewing the Berman
decision."4 Berman, she noted, defined the Fifth Amendment's public use
requirement to encompass any object that was within the state's police
power.45 With this backdrop, the Court held that the "'public use'
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of the sovereign's police
powers. ' 6 The Court then went on to reiterate that its role in reviewing a
legislative determination is very limited.4 7 "In short," wrote Justice
O'Connor, "the Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the
use be palpably without reasonable foundation."' 8 In Midkiff, the Court
held that redistribution of fee simples was a "rational exercise of the
eminent domain power," and, therefore, the Act passed the limited scrutiny
required by the Public Use Clause. 9
In deciding Midkiff, the Court clarified an unanswered question from
the Berman decision: whether the immediate transfer of condemned land to
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 233 (citing RAW. REV. STAT., ch. 516).
Id.

41.

Id.

42. Id. at 234-35.
43. Id. at 242.

44. Id. at 239.
45. Id. at 240.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
49. Id. at 243.
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private ownership was a per se violation of the Public Use Clause. 0
Berman decided that private parties could, ultimately, benefit from the use
of eminent domain as long as private developers were the tools for
achieving the clearly public purpose of redevelopment. 5 ' However, in
Berman, the land taken by eminent domain was first in the hands of the
government and only later transferred to developers.52 Justice O'Connor
noted that the Ninth Circuit Court read this fact in Berman to indicate that
government must "possess and use property at some point during a
taking., 53 However, if this were a requirement imposed by Berman, the
Hawaii Act would fail because it used eminent domain to facilitate a
transfer from54 lessor to lessee; the land was never held or used by the
government.
The unanimous Court decided that government need not actually hold
land in order to validate a public use.55 It held that "[t]he mere fact that
property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the first
instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having
only a private purpose." 56 The only limit that the Court recognized was that
the use of eminent domain could not be for a "purely private taking. '5 7 A
"purely private taking" would be one that served no legitimate
governmental purpose and would only benefit an identifiable, private
individual.5 8 The Court thus recognized that the strict view of the Public
Use Clause-requiring actual use of the land, by the public-was not the
law. 59 The Court affirmed that it had "long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.
"'It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion, ... directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for
it] to constitute a public use." 6
Midkiff advanced, but did not drastically alter, the Court's public use
jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor affirmed the very minimal role of courts
in second-guessing legislative determinations about the need for eminent
50. Id. at 243-44.
51. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954).
52. Id at 30.
53. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243 (noting that the Ninth Circuit "read our cases to stand for a
much narrower proposition").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 243-44.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 245.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 244.
60. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707
(1923)).
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domain. 6' The Court reaffirmed that private parties could be beneficiaries
of takings by eminent domain.6 2 Finally, Midkiff recognized that property
could be taken from person A and transferred directly to person B, if the
purpose of63that transfer was to achieve a public purpose, if not a literal
public use.
C. Kelo v. City of New London
In 1996, a major blow struck the residents of New London,
Connecticut. The United States government closed its Naval Undersea
Warfare Center, which employed over 1500 residents of a city with a
population of less that 24,000. 64 This misfortune, however, was not the
beginning of New London's economic downturn; it was a culmination of
decades of recession.6 5 The city's population had been steadily declining
and the unemployment steadily rising.6 6 By 1998, the population of New
London was at its lowest since 1920, and the unemployment rate was twice
that of Connecticut as a whole.67 As a response to these economic
conditions, state and local officials began a process of "economic
revitalization. 68 The means employed to catalyze this growth were the
subject of Kelo, of this Note, and of much public debate.
The city and state, to help spur economic development, utilized the
New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private, nonprofit
redevelopment organization. 69 The primary focus of the NLDC was the
redevelopment of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, which had been the
location of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center and was particularly
suffering from the economic problems.7 ° Using over $15 million from the
state, the NLDC undertook the creation of Fort Trumbull State Park and
welcomed pharmaceutical giant Pfizer to the neighborhood. 71 Believing
that this was the first step in the rebirth of New London, and that Pfizer
would bring businesses back to the city, the NLDC was prepared to expand
its efforts through a large-scale redevelopment plan centered around the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at240.
Id.at 243-44.
Id.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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72
new Pfizer facility.
With approval from the state and the city council, the NLDC was
primed to act on its master plan. 73 The multi-part development plan,
focused exclusively on the Fort Trumbull area, expanded over 115 private
and thirty-two public acres.74 The first part of the plan envisioned a
waterfront hotel surrounded by a "small urban village" as well as a
pedestrian walkway along the water connecting a series of commercial and
recreational marinas. 75 The second part was planned for eighty residences
and a U.S. Coast Guard Museum, to be linked by a walking path to the rest
of the redeveloped area.76 The third part, closest to the Pfizer facility,
would contain 90,000 square feet of research and development office space,
similar to the Pfizer offices.77 The last major aspect of the plan was a small
section next to the new state park, intended for parking or retail as support
for the park or the nearby marina.78 The remaining parts would be used for
office, retail, or other commerce. 79 All in all, the entire comprehensive plan
was expected to create over 1000 jobs, increase the tax base, revitalize the
economy, create a more attractive city, and increase leisure and recreational
opportunities."
Within the proposed redevelopment area, nine landowners, owning
fifteen total properties, were unwilling to sell their land to the NLDC for the
redevelopment effort. 8' Four of the properties were in the research and
development zone of the plan, and the remaining eleven were in the park or
marina support zone. 82 None of the properties were "blighted or otherwise
in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only because they
happened to be located in the development area" and the owners were
unwilling to sell.83 The NLDC, using eminent domain powers that had
been delegated to it by the city, initiated proceedings against the nine
owners who were unwilling to sell their land. 84
On the surface, the New London conflict appeared analogous to the
Berman facts, where non-blighted structures were taken for a broader and
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472, 474-75.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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comprehensive redevelopment plan. 85 However, New London was not
combating slums. Rather, it was combating economic decline. The
distinction between slum redevelopment and economically depressed
redevelopment was enough to persuade the Supreme Court to tackle the
case and to frame a significantly different legal question. The question
presented to the Court was "whether a city's decision to take property for
the purpose of economic 86
development satisfies the public use requirement
of the Fifth Amendment.,
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, began by reaffirming that the
state may not take property from A and give that property to B, for the sole
purpose of benefiting person B; likewise, he noted that the "familiar
example" of transferring property to a private party, such as a railroad
company, has been long accepted as a public use.87 The question, therefore,
was whether redevelopment in New London was more analogous to the
former or the latter. 88 "[T]he City's development plan," wrote Justice
Stevens, "was not adopted 'to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals."' 8 9 "On the other hand," he continued,
this is not a case in which the City is planning to open the
condemned land-at least not in its entirety-to use by the
general public. Nor will the private lessees of the land in any
sense be required to operate like
common carriers, making their
9
services available to all comers. 0
Recognizing that the proposed takings in New London did not fit into any
of these historical and categorical public use analyses, the Court considered
whether the New London plan called for an entirely new analysis. 91
Though economic development was the legally significant purpose of the
plan, the Court reasoned that there is "no principled way of distinguishing
economic development from the other public purposes that [it has]
recognized., 92 Midkiff had permitted the use of eminent domain to break a
85. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See id.at 477 (noting that "[n]either of these propositions ... determines the disposition of
this case").
88. See id.at 480 ("The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the
City's development plan serves a 'public purpose.').
89. Id.at 478 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
90. Id.at 478-79.
91. See id.at 483 (explaining that "our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power").
92. Id. at 484.
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land oligopoly, 93 Berman permitted the use of eminent domain for slum
redevelopment,9 4 and in another case the Court accepted the public purpose
of taking down barriers to entry into the pesticide market. 95 Of course, all
three of the above noted purposes serve an economic function and
contribute to economic development. Though the Kelo dissent argued a
and the previous jurisprudence, it struggled to
distinction between that case
96
find a principled argument.
Having announced that it would not create a new standard, the Court
simply applied the public purpose analysis of Berman and Midkiff.97 The
Court held that the New London "plan unquestionably serves a public
purpose. 98 Because Berman and Midkiff gave exceptional deference to
legislative determinations and aligned "public use" with the police power,
the real question in Kelo became whether the overall plan for
redevelopment was a legitimate use of the police power. That is, whether
the plan served the public purpose of protecting the health, safety, or
welfare of New London's residents. 99 The Court acknowledged that New
London and the NLDC had "carefully formulated an economic
development plan," and, because the City was due legislative deference, the
93. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
94. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
95. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-15 (1984); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at
480-82 (discussing the same three cases and the public purposes they allowed).
96. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494. Four justices dissented from the Kelo majority. Justice O'Connor
authored the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. The dissenters
argued that a principled distinction could be made between Kelo and previous decisions because in the
former, "a public use was realized when the harmful use [like a slum or a land oligopoly] was
eliminated." Id. at 500. The dissenters further noted that in the previous cases, "the extraordinary,
precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted an affirmative harm on society... and ... the
relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy
the harm." Id. By contrast, the dissent urged that the condemnation in Kelo was benefit conferring, that
economic redevelopment only secondarily benefits the public by giving the city higher tax revenue
rather than taking away a noxious use. Id.Interestingly, under its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court considered the harm-prevention versus benefit-conferring distinction to be
unprincipled. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-26 (1992). In Lucas, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefitconferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder." Id at 1024. As an example, the Court
reasoned that imposing an environmental restriction on an individual's land could be construed as
"necessary in order to prevent his use of it from 'harming' ... ecological resources; or, instead, in order
to achieve the 'benefits' of an ecological preserve." Id.Nonetheless, the Kelo dissenters, Justice Scalia
included, saw fit to reassert that previously inappropriate distinction for the purposes of prohibiting the
exercise of eminent domain for benefit--conferring legislation.
97. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 ("Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development
from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.").
98. Id.at 484.
99. See id.at 480 (addressing the issue of "whether the City's redevelopment plan serves a
'public purpose"').
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Court accepted the City's assertion that the plan would provide benefits to
the community, "including-but by no means limited to-new jobs and
increased tax revenue."' 00 Given that the City was "endeavoring to
coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of
land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its
parts" and because of the "comprehensive character of the plan, the
thorough deliberation ...and the limited scope of [the Court's] review,"
the New London plan had to be upheld. 1° 1 The Supreme Court held that
economic development
was a public use for the purpose of the Fifth
02
Amendment.1
The purpose of this Note, however, is not merely to analyze the legal
reasoning of the Kelo opinion. The purpose of this Note is to analyze the
response of state legislatures to an invitation extended by Justice Stevens in
the final paragraph of the opinion. Justice Stevens "emphasize[d] that
nothing in [the] opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many states
already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal
baseline."' 0 3 Thus, states were invited to change their laws as they felt
appropriate to react to the Kelo decision. Going even further, Justice
Stevens offered suggestions for methods of change, noting that many states'
rules "have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while
others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the
grounds upon which takings may be exercised."' 4
With that invitation in mind, especially considering the public outcry
after the Kelo decision, there is no end to how states may shape their own
law within the broad framework of the federal public use jurisdiction. As
of winter 2006, more than thirty-six states have moved to accept the Court's
invitation. 10 5 Their responses, though not yet finalized, represent a broad
range of possibilities. Vermont seeks to prohibit the use of eminent domain
for any project "solely or primarily" proposed for subsequent tax
increases; 106 New Jersey is considering a measure that would prohibit the
use of eminent domain on residential property that is not completely run
100. Id.at 483.
101. Id.at 483, 484.
102. Id.at484.
103. Id.at489.
104. Id.(internal citation omitted).
105. Broder, supra note 4.
106. Kristen Fountain, After Court Ruling, Lawmakers Debate Eminent Domain, CONCORD
MONITOR ONLINE, Feb. 19, 2006, availableat
http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060219/REPOSITORY/602190351/100
3/BUSINESS.
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down; New York may remove the rights of eminent domain from nonelected bodies; Texas has already prohibited the use of eminent domain to
benefit private parties (though they wrote in a specific exemption for the
Dallas Cowboys); California has six proposed measures and five proposed
constitutional amendments; and Ohio has already declared a moratorium on
all governmental takings until 2007.107 Considering the flood of activity, an
analysis of Delaware's quick and rather uncomplicated responses should be
very valuable to other jurisdictions in crafting their responses to Kelo's
invitation.
II. DELAWARE'S PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE

Look at Delaware's driver's license.

Look at Delaware's official

website.' 0 8 If you are driving through Delaware on 1-95, look at the
"Welcome to Delaware" sign. Delaware is the "First State" and proud of it.
So, it should be little surprise that Delaware was the first state to enact
legislation in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo.'0 9 The
crux of this Note is the effect that such legislation will have on
longstanding jurisprudence. Delaware has a rich and deeply-rooted public
use doctrine arising out of its own constitutional requirement that no
"person's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of
his or her representatives, and without compensation being made."' " 0 That
doctrine is the focus of this Part, which will begin with a look at cases that
recognize an allowance for some hybrid of public and private use and will
then turn to a series of cases that recognize specific public uses.
A. Public-PrivateHybrid
The following cases lay out the complicated public-private hybrid use
doctrine that has arisen in Delaware's eminent domain jurisprudence.
These cases are not particularly significant for the public use that they
recognize-roads, parking, or slum clearance-but for the amount of
private benefit that they allow and the judicial reasoning that they
demonstrate.

107. Broder, supra note 4.
108. The Official Website for the First State, http://www.delaware.com (last visited Apr. 5,
2007).
109. Smith Interview, supra note 5.
110. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (amended 1999).
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1. In re Hickman
In 1847, the Delaware courts were faced with the case of George
Hickman."' Though the antiquated format of this decision makes some of
the facts unclear, it appears that Hickman had a home set off from the
public road system. 1 2 Hickman sought to have a road built that would link
his property to the public network." 3 However, at least part of the land
needed for this private road was neither the property of Hickman nor the
state, but rather the property of private landowners." 4 Thus, Hickman
petitioned the state to acquire the necessary land for his road.' 15
The pertinent legal issue raised by Hickman's petition was whether the
laying of privately requested roads was a sufficient public use for the
purposes of exercising the state's power of eminent domain." 16 The court
began by answering a simpler question: whether eminent domain may be
used for the laying of purely public roads.' "7 Though it seems obvious
today, the Hickman court recounted that the use of eminent domain for the
building of public roads "has been exercised ... from the beginning,
without question."'" 8 The question of private roads, however, was not as
simple. The court held that land taken for private roads is, in fact "taken for
a public use, though upon private petition."''1 9 It further explained that
though a road may chiefly benefit a private party, roads built on private
petition are nonetheless "branches of the public roads and open to the
public," and the120public may use the road "so far as is necessary for the
common good."'
Ultimately, by holding that a road built primarily for the benefit of a
private individual can still be considered a public use, the court introduced
the reasoning that a paramount private interest does not doom a project if
lI . In re Hickman, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 580 (1847).

112. See id.at 581 (discussing a petition for the building of a road to be linked to the public
system). The court does not present any facts in this decision, which, in its entirety, is less that one
page. Id. However, given that Mr. Hickman petitioned for the building of a private road coupled with
the court's analysis of the benefits of that road, one might easily assume that Mr. Hickman was a private
homeowner seeking access to the public road system. In any case, the facts, as set forth in this Note, are
not clearly stated in the decision but are instead gleaned from the court's analysis.
113. See id.
at 581 (discussing a petition for the building of a public road).
114. See id.at 580 (considering an objection to the use of eminent domain for the building of a
road).
115. Id.
116. See id.at 581 (holding that it is within the legislature's power to use eminent domain to
build roads that serve the public).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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the project augments access to a recognized public use. The court,
considering the benefit of the road, explained, "[i]t is a part of the system of
public roads; essential to the enjoyment of those which are strictly public;
for many neighborhoods as well as individuals would be deprived of the
benefit of the public highway, but for outlets laid out on private petition. ' ' 21
Thus the Delaware courts recognized roads as a public use of land and laid
the foundation for a hybrid public-private use.
2. Clendanielv. Conrad
Route 13 runs the entire length of Delaware, a major north-south route
from Wilmington to Dover. This road, originally known as DuPont
Boulevard, was proposed to the general assembly in March 1911 and built
by Thomas Coleman du Pont shortly thereafter. 122 In order to construct the
road, du Pont and his colleagues requested that the state authorize the
purchase or condemnation of a strip of land no more than 200 feet wide
running the length of the state. 23 Within this strip of land, du Pont foresaw
a road, approximately thirty feet wide,
road accessories, public utilities, as
124
well as trees, grass, and shrubberies.
After completion of a survey of the land on which the future Route 13
would run, Jehu H. Clendaniel discovered that the proposed highway would
require the use of part of his land. 125 Clendaniel, however, was unwilling to
sacrifice his land to the project. 26 Loath to redesign the route, du Pont
27
asked that the state condemn the land so that his road could be built.1
Clendaniel objected, asserting that du Pont and his colleagues would not be
using the land for public use because only 30 feet of the 200 foot strip of
condemned land would actually be used for a roadway; moreover, while the
road itself would be owned by the state,128 du Pont and his colleagues would
still own the 170 feet flanking the road.
The court was faced with the question of whether property could be
taken by eminent domain when it would be used for a road that was a
recognized public use, but was also privately owned, in part, and only
tangentially part of the conceded public use. 12 9 In working through this
12!.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Clendaniel v. Conrad, 83 A. 1036, 1038 (Del. 1912).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1039.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1040.
Id. at 1038.
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question, the court started by noting that the entire boulevard, road and
accessories, were part of the same project, despite a variance in
ownership. 130 The court recognized that because the land "contain[ed] a
road for vehicular travel," the accessories, such as "trees, walks and other
parking features," were all part of the general purpose of the project. 13 1
With the understanding that they were only dealing with one project,
the court was prepared to answer the question of whether that project was a
sufficient public use. Without much consideration, the court held that
"[t]here can be no doubt that every one of the features or elements of the
boulevard contemplated by the statute, road, railway, telegraph and
telephone lines, pipe lines, and the beautification of the land by walks,
trees, etc., has been judicially decided to be a public use.' ' 132 However, the
court made two additional statements that may have a great deal of
applicability today.
First, in considering the extent of the state's condemnation power, the
court noted that eminent domain might be exercised "any time the public
welfare, or the public necessity, in the judgment of the Legislature, should
require it.' ' 13 3 By allowing for condemnation when the public welfare or
necessity may require it, the court broadened the understanding of public
use beyond a literal interpretation requiring the public to actually use the
land. Second, the Supreme Court of Delaware wrestled with the same
question that the United States Supreme Court toiled with in Kelo: whether
anything that might convey a significant private benefit could be considered
a public use. 134 On this point, the Delaware court held that "[a] certain
person may ask for the enactment of legislation that would be beneficial to
himself, and the Legislature may conclude that such legislation would be of
general benefit and enact a general statute."' 35 Thus, in 1912, nearly 100
years prior to Kelo-where the United States Supreme Court announced
that a single, "carefully formulated," and "comprehensive" plan that will
benefit the public, is an acceptable public use' 3 6 -the Supreme Court of
Delaware made essentially the same decision, stating that "a single scheme,
is an adequate public use
one comprehensive plan of public improvement,"
37
1
domain.
eminent
exercising
of
for the purposes

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.at 1042-43.
Id.
at 1043.
Id.at 1046.
Id. at 1052 (emphasis added).
Id.
at 1044; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,477-78 (2005).
Clendaniel, 83 A. at 1044.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483, 484.
Clendaniel, 83 A. at 1042.
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3. Wilmington ParkingAuthority v. Ranken
Wilmington ParkingAuthority v. Ranken, like Kelo at the federal level,
does not seem to represent a major doctrinal change in eminent domain
jurisprudence. 38 Instead, Ranken articulates a new standard for
balancing
39
public use and private benefits already permitted under the law. 1
In 195 1, the Parking Authority Act was passed, delegating power to the
Wilmington Parking Authority (WPA) to research, construct, and maintain
off-street parking facilities, and to acquire the land necessary for such
facilities. 40 As WPA's first project, it sought to construct a parking garage
in the heart of Wilmington's business district. 141 The WPA determined that
the project should be economically self-sustaining; thus, it intended to lease
portions of the ground floor of the garage
to private businesses that would
42
WPA.
the
to
payments
lease
make
then
The parcel on which the WPA planned to build consisted of four
separate lots, three of which were bought on the open market. 43 The
owners of the final lot, however, were unwilling to sell, thus making
clear
44
that, inevitably, the lot would need to be taken by eminent domain.
The owners of the final lot, including Ranken, objected to the taking
and claimed that the creation of off-street parking was not a public use and,
even if it were a public use, the intention to lease space in the parking
facility to private enterprises would override the public character of the
project as a whole. 45 The court quickly dismissed the contention that
public parking was not a public use, noting that "[s]ixty years ago no one
would have suggested that the state-operated livery stable served a public
purpose.'46 The court queried "[a]t the present day, who can doubt that the
grave problems created by the automobile, including parking, are a fit
subject for public concern?"'' 47 Deferring to the legislature, the court then
concluded that parking is a "public use[] for which public money may be
spent and private property may be acquired by the exercise of the power of
138. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614,622 (Del. 1954).
139. Id.
140. Id.at 618; Parking Authority Law, 48 Del. Laws 1015 (1951).
141. Ranken, 105 A.2d at 618.
142. See id.The parking garage was to be financed using revenue bonds. The court noted the
WPA's finding that a facility
dedicated solely to parking would only provide a return on investment of
4.15%, while a return of 8.5% was required to market the bonds. Id. As a result, the WPA turned to

leasing to make up the difference. Id.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id. at619,621.
146. Id. at619.
147. Id.
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eminent domain.' 48 The court also noted "the breadth of the concept of
public purpose has increased and is increasing, but it requires
an extreme
49
case for a court to say that it 'ought to be diminished."",1
The court discussed further a resolution to the second question:
whether a parking facility that serves a public use can also benefit private
interests. 50 Ranken objected that nearly 40% of the project would be
devoted to commercial use and that the project thus had "a dual charactera merger of public and private uses that cannot be separated and for which
the State may not condemn private property."1 5' After much discussion of
precedent from other jurisdictions, the court arrived at a standard of review
for determining the acceptable relationship between public use and private
benefits. 152 The test was constructed such that "the reviewing court must be
satisfied that the underlying purpose-the motivating desire--of the public
authority is the benefit to the general public. If a self-styled public project
is so designed that in fact private interests are the chief beneficiaries, a
remedy is available."' 53 Thus, the court concluded that "[c]ommercial
' 54
leasing of public property, in itself, is not necessarily unconstitutional,"'
and that since "the purpose of the project as a whole [was] a public one,"
the use of eminent domain was valid. 55 With that holding, public parking
became a recognized public use and the holdings of Hickman and
Clendaniel were reiterated: a public use may result in private benefits if the
project, on balance, is for the public use.
4. Randolph v. Wilmington HousingAuthority
Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority represents the first major
application of Ranken's primary purpose test. 5 6 Mrs. Randolph owned
property in an area of Wilmington that had been declared a "slum area" and
was slated for acquisition and redevelopment. 157 The "slum area" was 38.2
acres over 21.5 city blocks and contained 638 structures, of which 606 were

148. Id. at 619-20 (quoting 22 Del. C. § 501 (1953)).
149. Id. at 627.
150. Id. at622.
151. Id. at621.
152. Id. at626.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 630. Ultimately, the Ranken court held that some aspects of the project were invalid,
not because of any constitutional issues, but because the negotiation and bidding procedures did not
comport with the statutory guidelines. Id. at 635.
156. Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139 A.2d 476, 483 (Del. 1958).
157. Id. at 479-80.
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residential properties containing 970 total dwelling units.,"
Of all the
structures in the area, 97% were "dilapidat[ed] or deteriorat[ed]," 55% had
"substandard alterations," 99% had "inadequate original construction," 97%
were "improperly maintained," and 77.3% were in violation of the fire
code. 159 Miraculously, and very similarly to Berman, Randolph's property
had none of these problems and was considered a "safe and sound
structure," but was still slated for acquisition because of its location within
the slum area. 160 Moreover, the ultimate plan for redevelopment of the
slum area was to sell the acquired property rights to private developers for
redevelopment.' 16 Needless to say, Randolph objected to the acquisition
and razing of her property. 162 Three pertinent legal questions arose from
Randolph's objection.
The first question was whether the clearance and redevelopment of a
slum area was a valid public purpose. 163 Randolph argued that slum
clearance was not a public use of her land since that goal could be
accomplished by the exercise of the police powers or the innovation of
private enterprise.' 64 The court (in a less than convincing manner) noted
simply that "to date, neither the exercise of the police power nor the
operation of private enterprise has abolished the slum.' ' 165 The court then
augmented its reasoning by noting that the legislature had determined that
slum clearance was a public use of land, and, because no other method had
yet worked, the court could not say that the legislative judgment was
wrong. 166 Thus, slum clearance became a legislatively and judicially
recognized public use in Delaware.
The second question was whether the condemnation of a non blighted
building was valid when the acquisition of that building was part of a larger
slum clearance project. 16' The court found no problem in condemning a
sound structure as part of a slum clearance. 68 It reasoned that a slum is a
legislatively determined area where the preponderance of buildings is

158. Id.at 479.
159. Id.
160. Id.at 480. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954) (considering the
validity of the use of eminent domain powers for the taking of a non-blighted structure that sat in a
larger area with significant blight problems).
161. Randolph, 139 A.2d at 479.
162. Id.at 480.
163. Id.at481.
164. Id.
165. Id.at 482.
166. Id.
167. Id.at 484.
168. Id.
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substandard. 169 The fact that an individual building in a slum area was not
contributing to the slum did not undo the condition of the general area. 7 °
The court very aptly recognized that "hardship may always exist when the
power of eminent domain is exercised," but this could not undo the fact that
the taking, even of a non-blighted structure, was still for a public use."'
The third question with which the court dealt with recalled the Ranken
primary purpose test. 172 Randolph urged that even if the clearance was for a
public use, the redevelopment could not be considered a public use because
the land, taken by eminent domain, would be immediately sold to private
developers.173 The court framed the question this way: "is slum clearance
or redevelopment the primary purpose?"' 174 The court again deferred to the
legislative finding that slums were the evil that the legislature sought to
cure, and the court reasoned that without subsequent redevelopment, the
slum clearance would accomplish very little. 75 Presumably, the court took
for granted that the redevelopment could not be done without the
involvement of private developers.
The most important thing to note may be the way in which the
Delaware Supreme Court framed this third question. The court began with
the primary purpose test but did not balance the public purpose with the
private benefit, as it had in Ranken. 176 Rather, the court balanced the public
purpose of slum clearance with the redevelopment phase of the project, and
asked whether slum clearance or redevelopment was the primary
purpose. 177 In so doing, the court seemed to have presupposed that
redevelopment, on its own, could not be a public use. 178 That is to say, the
use of eminent domain may not be acceptable for a project that is simply
redevelopment. There must be a prevailing public use, such as slum
clearance. Since this assertion is not explicit, the reasoning is also not
explicit. However, the court appears to have simply looked to Randolph's
argument-that the redevelopment would transfer the property to private
interests-and assumed that redevelopment could
never be accomplished
1 79
without a correlative benefit to private developers.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 481; Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614, 626 (Del. 1954).
173. Randolph, 139 A.2d at 481.
174. Id. at 483.
175. Id.
176. Id.; Ranken, 105 A.2d at 626.
177. Randolph, 139 A.2d at 483.
178. See id. (reasoning that redevelopment is a valid undertaking only because it "follows as a
necessary consequence" of slum clearance).
179. See id (agreeing with Mrs. Randolph that "the State may not constitutionally condemn

2007]

Post-Kelo Legislative Activity

5. Libby's Case
Libby's is a small, diner-like, Greek restaurant in the center of
Wilmington's business district. Libby's is the type of restaurant where
businessmen and blue-collar workers rub shoulders over Greek salad or
breakfast (served all day), and where many of the lawyers who litigated the
cases discussed in this Note regularly ate their lunches. When one enters
through the front door of Libby's there is a coat rack, an umbrella stand,
and a counter with a cash register. Immediately above the cash register is
an enlargement of a front page from the local daily paper. Below the
headline is a picture of Libby with a huge smile on her face and her hands
thrown in the air. The day before that paper was published, the Delaware
determined that Libby's restaurant would not be turned
Supreme Court had
180
into a parking lot.
The City of Wilmington delegated some of its condemnation powers to
the WPA, which, as noted earlier, was charged with fulfilling the city's
parking needs.1 81 In 1986, the WPA proposed a seven-story parking
,garage, with 950 parking spaces, which was to cover the entire block bound
by Tatnall, Eighth, Girard, and Tillman Streets-the same block on which
Libby's was located. 182 However, like Ranken, the project was not to be
entirely dedicated to public parking.1 83 The Wilmington News Journal, the
preeminent Delaware newspaper, was to be the recipient of the ground level
rights in the property, and the WPA would retain only rights in the floors
above the News Journal's property. 184 The purpose of this arrangement was
two fold. First, providing a convenient downtown location for the News
Journal was an incentive to induce the paper to keep its facilities within the
city limits. 185 Second, the purchase price that the News Journal was to pay
to the WPA was needed to make the project economically feasible for the
private property if the primary purpose of the condemnation is the transfer of the property to private
use").

180. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. 227 W. 8th St., 516 A.2d 483, 483 (Del. 1986). The entirety
of Libby's Case was dealt with in three decisions: a decision by the trial court, an order by the Delaware
Supreme Court, and an opinion by the Delaware Supreme Court. The above-cited authority is the Order
of the Supreme Court, which was issued five months before the opinion supporting that order was
see also Wilmington Parking Auth. v. 227 W. 8th St., 521 A.2d 227, 230 (Del. 1986)
issued. Id.;
[hereinafter Libby Opinion] (stating that the Wilmington Parking Authority did not "act within its
statutorily limited purpose of providing for needed public parking").
181. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. 227 W. 8th St., No. 265, 1986 WL 10505, at *1 (Del. Super.
Ct. Aug. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Libby Trial]; Parking Authority Law, 48 Del. Laws 1015 (1951).
182. Libby Trial, 1986 WL 10505, at *6.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.

684
city.
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186

It is probably obvious at this point that not every property owner on the
soon-to-be-a-parking-garage block was willing to sell. In particular,
Theodore and Labrini (a/k/a Libby) Hantzandeou, the owners of Libby's,
wanted to keep their restaurant. 8 7 The WPA moved for immediate
possession of Libby's by eminent domain.188 Libby and her husband
opposed the WPA's attempt to condemn their land, arguing that the
condemnation was not primarily for the public benefit, but rather,
was for
89
the primary benefit of the News Journal, a private corporation.
Two separate legal questions arose out of Libby's opposition to the
condemnation. The first question was whether the building of a garage that
would belong, in large part, to a private enterprise, was a valid public
use. 190 This first question was easily answered. The Delaware Supreme
Court, relying on Ranken and Randolph, held that if the primary benefit of
the project was parking, "the fact that a parking facility will have multiple
purposes does not in and of itself render the proposed taking one for private
rather than public purposes."19
'
However, the court reasoned that the
primary purpose analysis was a factual analysis and, therefore, relied on the
trial court's finding that the primary purpose was not to benefit the public
through parking, but rather to benefit the public through the economic
benefits of retaining the News Journal as a corporate citizen. 192 This
finding was based in large part on the fact that the WPA had not even
considered the present location for a garage until the city suggested that the
WPA engage the News Journal in a joint venture. 193 The court, however,
did not decide the case on this issue alone.
The second question was dispositive: whether, if the public were the
primary beneficiary of the project, the WPA had the statutory authority to
condemn property for any public benefit other than parking.' 94 The
Delaware Supreme Court stated, "[a]lthough we examine the primary
purpose rule as it developed in the constitutional context, we apply it here
to determine whether the WPA's proposed condemnation was invalid as
beyond its statutory purpose, i.e., to provide public parking."' 95 The court
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Libby Opinion, 521 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 1986).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 233-34; Libby Trial, 1986 WL 10505 at *1, *7.
Libby Trial, 1986 WL 10505 at *7.
Libby Opinion, 521 A.2d at 231.
Id.
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proceeded to look to the statute creating the WPA and authorizing the
Authority to exercise eminent domain.' 96 With that statutory authority in
mind, the court held that although the primary purpose of the exercise
benefited the public, that benefit was not related to parking and was,
therefore, outside of the statutory authority of the WPA. 197 The court,
therefore, applied the primary purpose test only as a threshold step to
determine if the revealed purpose was one that the WPA was statutorily
authorized to create.
Libby's Case presents an example of an invalid exercise of eminent
domain because the public benefit was only incidental to a private benefit.
However, the court's holding-that the plan was invalid due to the WPA
having exceeded its authority to condemn land for parking projects-is
explicitly limited, thus reducing the significance of the case. 98 Thus, two
questions remain. The first is whether the project in Libby's Case would
have been approved had a body with greater eminent domain powers been
in charge. The second question is still "What can I get for ya' hun?"
B. Public Uses Without SubstantialPrivateBenefits
Unlike the foregoing cases, where the judicial reasoning is more
important than the public purpose considered, the following cases simply
announce, or affirm, specific public uses. The opposition in the following
cases did not arise because any public use might have been vitiated by a
private benefit. The opposition arose because parties felt that the takings
were not a public use per se.
1. Piekarskiv. State
Piekarski v. State announced that prevention of beach erosion is a
public use.' 99 The state had entrusted the Department of Natural Resources
and Environmental Control (DNREC) with, among other things, the
protection and enhancement of Delaware's beaches.20 0 In this particular
case, Bowers Beach was experiencing significant erosion, and DNREC
sought easements from all fifty-nine landowners along the beach in order to
place beach fill on their land. 20 ' Fifty-two of the fifty-nine owners

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 234 (stating that "the primary objective must be parking").
Piekarski v. State, 373 A.2d 209, 209 (Del. 1977).
Id.
Id.
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voluntarily granted rights to DNREC, but the remaining seven refused.2 °2
Given that the holdout properties were in the middle of the beach, the
project could not go forward without their involvement.22 4°3 Thus, DNREC
sought to obtain the easements through eminent domain. 0
The Piekarskis and the other defendants asserted that erosion
prevention was not a public use and could not support the use of eminent
domain. 20 5 The court considered that the project was suggested to DNREC
by residents of Bowers Beach rather than a formulation of the agency itself,
that foundations of many of the houses were in jeopardy, and that the
project would be ineffective without access to the defendants' land.20 6 With
all this in mind, the court simply held that erosion control is a public use of
land.20 7
2. New Castle County School District v. State
The overarching question presented in New Castle County School
District v. State was one of a complicated chain of title that meandered
among public and private hands between 1937 and 1980.208 Ultimately, the
state sought to purchase the property in question from the school board in
order to turn it into a public park.20 9 The state, by statute, set a nominal
purchase price of one dollar.210 The school district challenged the purchase,
not on public use grounds, but rather on the state of the title.21 ' However,
before moving to the paramount question presented, the court needed to
ensure that the purpose for which the state would be expending public funds
was, in fact, a public use.2 12 The court announced that there is "no
question" that building a park is a public purpose.2 13
3. Cannon v. State
Cannon v. State announced that indirect public uses can support the

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at210.

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. New Castle County Sch. Dist. v. State, 424 A.2d 15, 16-17 (Del. 1980).

209. Id. at 17.
210. Id. at 16.
211. Id. at 17.

212. Id.
213. Id.
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exercise of eminent domain. 214 An important question that Cannon left
open, however, was whether eminent domain may be exercised in order to
acquire land for environmental protection.
The Delaware Department of Transportation (DelDOT) intended to
implement a plan that would alter the path of Route 54.215 In the course of
this alteration, a certain amount of federally designated wetlands would
need to be filled.216 Federal law, however, mandates that no project may
result in a net loss of wetlands.217 Thus, when DelDOT filled wetlands,
they would have to mitigate by creating new wetland areas.218
Unfortunately for Everett and Allie Cannon, their coastal farm was selected
not only as part of the route over which the road would run, but also as the
land to be used for the wetlands mitigation.2 19
The Cannons did not object to the use of their land for the purposes of
road construction, but they asserted that wetlands mitigation did not serve a
sufficient public purpose. 220 The court did not focus on the public value of
wetlands mitigation in and of itself; rather, it focused on the consequences
of prohibiting condemnation for wetlands mitigation. 22 1 The court reasoned
that if the mitigation could not proceed, then the federal authorities would
not permit the redirection of the road because it would result in a net loss of
wetlands. 222 Thus, the court recognized that environmental mitigation
constitutes a public use "if necessary to advance the underlying purpose of
construction and maintenance of the State's roadways. 2 23 One might
assume that this reasoning would also apply to other public uses recognized
by the legislature and the courts. However, the implication might be that
environmental protection, on its own, is not a public use.
C. Delaware's Law in Light ofKelo
Delaware's public use jurisprudence seems to be stricter and less
deferential than the federal jurisprudence. Thus, the Kelo decision seems
unlikely to have much of a direct effect on the application of eminent

214.
215.
216.
217.

Cannon v. State, 807 A.2d 556, 559 (Del. 2002).
Id.at 558.
Id.
Id. (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344); see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (2006)

(outlining wetlands mitigation policy that applies to the Corps of Engineers).
218.
219.
220.
221.

Cannon, 807 A.2d at 558.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 560.

222. Id.at 559.
223. Id.
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domain in Delaware. In the most basic sense, Kelo held that economic
development is a public use.224 This will have the minimal effect on every
state of extending the breadth of the federal baseline such that any state
could now choose to extend their public use requirements.22 5 However, in
Delaware, Ranken,22 6 Randolph,22 7 and Libby's Case228 already announced
limits that are tighter than the federal baseline.
Ranken created the "primary purpose" threshold for determining
whether a project had a sufficient public use.229 In so holding, the court
placed the burden on the government to show that the primary purpose was
a public one. 230 This added burden on the government is a safeguard that is
not offered by the highly deferential federal jurisprudence. 23' Moreover,
Libby's Case is a clear demonstration of the high scrutiny that the Delaware
Supreme Court will apply to the government's proffered public use. There,
the court looked to timing of the project, communications with the alleged
private beneficiary, studies done by the condemning authority, other
tangential actions of the condemning authority, and the design of the
project, but gave no indication that future inquiries would be limited to
these factors.23 2
Whether Kelo could have happened in Delaware, or any state
considering responsive legislation, should be carefully considered by state
legislators. Otherwise, the nature and scope of their legislation will not be
responsive to the specifics of Kelo or the needs of constituents, but rather
the legislation will be responsive only to superficial political puffery.
Given the state of Delaware's law, Kelo seemingly could not have
happened there. In Kelo, had the Supreme Court applied the same scrutiny
that the Delaware courts applied in Libby's Case, there is a high likelihood
that it would have determined that the primary purpose of the plan was to
benefit Pfizer. Though Pfizer relocated to Fort Trumbull before New
London attempted to exercise eminent domain, clearly one of the major
purposes of the economic redevelopment project was to provide a richer
cultural and economic base for the new facility. 233 The development plan at
224. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,484 (2005).
225. Id. at 489.
226. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614, 626 (Del. 1954).
227. Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139 A.2d 476, 483 (Del. 1958).
228. Libby Opinion, 521 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 1986).
229. Ranken, 105 A.2d at 626.
230. Id.
231. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (noting that "broad latitude" is
given to legislatures "in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power").
232. Libby Opinion, 521 A.2d at 230, 233.

233. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474-75.
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issue in Kelo was approved only two months after Pfizer announced that it
as a way to
would move to the neighborhood.234 The plan was even billed
"complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build., 235
Moreover, Kelo should have little impact on Delaware because
Randolph has already hinted that economic development cannot, on its
own, stand as a public purpose.236 Recall that in Randolph, the court
balanced two purposes-slum clearance and redevelopment-in
determining the real primary purpose of the government action.237 The
court held that slum clearance was the primary purpose and that
redevelopment was only a necessary follow-up to that purpose.238 The clear
implication of this construction is that redevelopment is not a valid public
purpose because, had redevelopment been the victor in the primary purpose
face-off, the court would have invalidated the project. 239 Kelo dealt with
nothing more than a development project. So, it seems likely that had that
fact pattern been tried in the Delaware courts, the opposite outcome would
have been reached.
Delaware's public use doctrine is more limited than the federal
doctrine, thus, Kelo will have little impact on the state. Nonetheless, the
general assembly has decided to act in response to the decision, and the
results of their reaction may be much further reaching than Kelo alone ever
could have been.

III. ACCEPTING THE INVITATION: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO KELO
Kelo will not fade into constitutional history without having aroused
lawmakers throughout the country. The question is whether this arousal
will produce a substantial and functional change in the law, whether it will
produce weak and ineffective legislation, or whether it will so stimulate the
ire of reactionary lawmakers that its product will be overbearing and short
lived. Common sense suggests the latter.
As previously noted, approximately three dozen states have begun to
craft legislation in response to Kelo. 24 0 The federal government has
introduced measures of its own. 24 1 Pennsylvania, Delaware's neighbor to
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
purpose).
240.
241.

Id.at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.(quoting Application to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139 A.2d 476, 483 (Del. 1958).
Id.
Id.
See id.(finding that the project was valid because redevelopment was only a secondary
Broder, supra note 4.
House Bill Counters Eminent Domain Ruling, Nov. 4, 2005,
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the north, has introduced thirty-three eminent domain bills since the
decision was handed down.242 Delaware has only introduced three
measures.2 3 There is no indication that Delaware's activity is particularly
notable when considered in light of legislation in thirty-six other states,
including a neighbor that has eleven times more activity. But Delaware
was the first state to respond to Kelo.244 Thus, the three measures in the
Delaware General Assembly should serve as good examples of what other
states might enact, what other states might avoid, and what other states
might emulate. The ultimate fate of these bills is not important for the
purposes of this Note. Instead, these measures, taken together, should be
viewed as a clearinghouse of terms, clauses, and ideas that other states may
look to for guidance, both good and bad, in crafting legislation in response
Kelo.
A. Senate Bill 217
Five days after the Supreme Court ruled on Kelo, the Delaware General
24
Assembly had already introduced a bill in response.24
Delaware Senate
Bill (S.B.) 217 amended title 29 of the Delaware Code, which deals broadly
with state government.246 The purpose of the Bill was to "address[] various
abuses and uncertainties relating to the exercise of the State's power of
eminent domain and the protection of private property rights. 247
The first section of S.B. 217 imposes specific use limits and procedural
limits on the state's eminent domain power. It requires that "the acquisition
of real property through the exercise of eminent domain by any agency
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,174495,00.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
242. Sam Spatter, 33 Eminent Domain Bills Crafied, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Sept. 24
2005, availableat http://pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/business/s_377382.html.
243. S.B. 217, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005); S.B. 221, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st
Sess. (Del. 2005); H.R. Con. Res. 38, 143d Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Del. 2005); H.R. Res. 44, 143d
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005). Delaware House Concurrent Resolution 38 and Delaware House
Resolution 44 are identical resolutions enacted separately for procedural purposes and, therefore, act as
one resolution. Telephone Interview with Bernard Brady, Secretary of the Senate, Del. Gen. Assemb.,
in Dover, Del. (Aug. 15, 2005).
244. Smith Interview, supra note 5.
245. See State of Delaware: The Official Website for the First State, An Act to Amend Title 29
of the Delaware Code Relating to Real Property Acquisition and the Exercise of Eminent Domain,
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LIS/LIS143.NSF/vwlegislation/SB+217?opendocument (last visited Jan.
26, 2007) [hereinafter Leg. Synopsis of S.B. 217] (noting that S.B. 217 was introduced on June 28,
2005).
246. S.B. 217. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 (2003) (governing the general assembly,
constitutional offices, administrative agencies, public officers and employees, state planning and
property acquisition and other aspects of state government).
247. Leg. Synopsis of S.B. 217, supra note 245.
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shall be undertaken, and the property used, only for the purposes of a
recognized public use. 248 It then outlines the procedural requirements
associated with the new limit, mandating that the "recognized public use"
be publicly explained "at least [six] months in advance of the institution of
condemnation proceedings: (i) in a certified planning document, (ii) at a
public hearing held specifically to address
the acquisition, or (iii) in a
249
published report of the acquiring agency.
S.B. 217's second section addresses the cost of condemnation
proceedings.250 Title 29, section 9503 of the Delaware Code awards
attorney's fees as well as appraisal and engineering fees to a landowner if a
condemnation proceeding against their property fails.25 1 Under that
formulation, the amount of fees to be paid is determined by "the opinion of
the [condemning] agency., 25 2 S.B. 217 simply replaces the word "agency"
253
with the word "court," thereby allowing the courts to determine costs.
Presumably, this measure will limit frivolous condemnation proceedings by
increasing the likelihood that higher costs will be assessed against the
agency.
When S.B. 217 was introduced, its sponsor, Senator Robert L.
Venables, offered a credible defense of the measure.254 The Senator first
noted that it "was not a complete knee [jerk] reaction" because it had
actually been drafted and originally introduced before Kelo was handed
down.25 5 However, he felt the reintroduction of the bill was called for
256
because Kelo had diminished the importance of private property rights.
Senator Venables thought that this whittling away of property rights should
not stand because "private property rights is [sic] as important as freedom
of speech . .. . Private property rights is [sic] something that made this
country great," and "the Founding Fathers, when they put the clause for
eminent domain in the Constitution were thinking about roads and buildings
that benefit all the citizens. 257 The Senator insisted that "more tax"-the
benefit allowed by Kelo-is not a benefit to all citizens. 8
248. S.B. 217.
249. Id.

250. Id.
251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9503 (2003).
252. Id.
253. S.B. 217.
254. Audio tape: Senate Debate on S.B. 217, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (June 29, 2005)
(hereinafter S.B. 217 Senate Debate] (statement of Senator Robert L. Venables) (on file with author and
available from the Delaware General Assembly).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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Senator Venables's comments seemed to please the other senators.
However, the language of the bill itself did raise some questions. 259 Senator
Steven H. Amick questioned what exactly a "recognized public use" was
and whether that wording was too broad or unclear.26 ° In response, though
not very responsive to the concern, Senator John C. Still sought to explain
the intent of the bill for any court (or perhaps law student) that might be
listening to the debate for guidance on how to interpret the measure. 26' The
purpose, explained Senator Still, was to prevent commercial enterprises
from taking private homes.262 The Senator asserted that the only intent of
the bill was to prevent commercial uses of eminent domain and nothing
264
else. 263 "That's what I took" from S.B. 217, announced Senator Still.
To augment Senator Still's comments, Senator Harris B. McDowell
noted that S.B. 221 was a companion bill to S.B. 217 and should further
explain the intent of the general assembly.265 Senator Venables rose again
to reiterate that the only intention of S.B. 217 was to deal with "private to
private" condemnation, "like Kelo.''266 Though not many questions were
answered, the debate was closed267after Senator Venables's last comments,
and the Bill passed unanimously.
Only one representative spoke when S.B. 217 unanimously passed the
House of Representatives.26 8 Representative Wayne A. Smith, sponsor of
Delaware House Concurrent Resolution 38, affirmed that there would be a
further response despite S.B. 217, because many people were "deeply
concerned" about the consequences. 269 That assurance was enough to
garner the votes of all forty-one representatives in favor of S.B. 217.27
Having passed the House and Senate unanimously, S.B. 217 was
259. See id.(statement of Senator Steven H. Amick) (applauding the bill's intent and asking for
explanations of certain phrases).
260. Id.
261. Id.(statement of Senator John C. Still).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. (statement of Senator Harris B. McDowell). Strangely, the Senator also admitted that
he had not read Kelo, raising the question of how many of the Senators had, in fact,
read the opinion. Id.
266. Id. (statement of Senator Venables). Senator Venables's comments about the meaning of
Kelo seem to indicate that he too had yet to read the decision, which would have demonstrated that Kelo
was not announcing a principle that allowed condemnation for purely private benefits. Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
267. S.B. 217 Senate Debate, supra note 254.
268. Audio tape: House of Representatives Debate on S.B. 217, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(June 30, 2005) (statement of Representative Wayne A. Smith) (on file with author and available from
the Delaware General Assembly).
269. Id.
270. Id.
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signed by the Governor and became law on July 21, 2005.271
B. Senate Bill 221
Delaware Senate Bill 221 was brought to the floor on the same day as
S.B. 217.272 S.B. 221 would amend, inter alia, title 10, section 6105(b) of
the Delaware Code.273 The stated purpose of the bill is to "prohibit[] the
condemnation of private property where no specific public use is to be
made to the property," thus complementing S.B. 217 by governing the
courts similarly to the way S.B. 217 governs agencies.274
The first section of S.B. 221 heightens the requirements for complaints
in condemnation proceedings. 275 The language of title 10, section 6105(b)
of the Delaware Code mandates:
a short and plain statement of the authority for the taking, the use
for which the property is to be taken, a description of the
property sufficient for its identification, the interest to be
acquired, and, as to each separate piece of property, a designation
of the defendants who276have been joined as owners thereof or of
some interest therein.
S.B. 221 would simply add the words "a specific and detailed statement of
the public" just before the words "use for which the property is to be
taken." 277 Thus, the new clause of section 6105(b) would read "a specific
and detailed statement of the public use for which the property is to be
taken. 278
The second section of S.B. 221 instructs a court to dismiss any
complaint that does not contain the statement required by section one, and it
seeks to define what public uses are "sufficient" for the exercise of eminent
domain. 279 The bill explicitly states that a "general public purpose" does
271. Leg. Synopsis of S.B. 217, supra note 245.
272. State of Delaware: The Official Website for the First State, An Act to Amend Title 10 of
the Delaware Code Relating to Condemnation Proceedings,
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LlS/L1S 143.NSF/vwlegislation/SB+221 ?opendocument (last visited Apr. 5,
2007) [hereinafter Leg. Synopsis of S.B. 221].
273. S.B. 221, 143d Gen Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6105(b) (1999).
274. Leg. Synopsis of S.B. 221, supra note 272; see also S.B. 217, 143d Gen. Assemb., Ist
Sess. (Del. 2005) (limiting the activity of state agencies with respect to condemnation proceedings).
275. S.B. 221 (proposing to amend § 6105(b)).
276. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6105(b) (1999).
277. S.B. 221.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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not warrant a taking. 280 Moreover, the bill directs that "[t]here must be a
showing that a specific public use will be made with the taken property and
that the members of the general public, including those from whom the
property is being taken, will realize an immediate and direct benefit from
such taking., 281 It then goes on to enumerate some public uses that will be
satisfactory, including "the construction or maintenance of public buildings,
roads, schools, hospitals, railroads, reservoirs and/or utilities. 282 S.B. 221
next notes that public use "may not include revenue generation, economic
development, or the re-development of currently occupied residences
and
283
may not result in the displacement of the residents of the property.1
The original S.B. 221 was amended twice before it passed in the
Senate. 284 The first amendment added parks to the list of enumerated public
uses. 285 The second amendment removed "redevelopment of currently
occupied residences and may not result in the displacement of the residents
of the property", from the list of specifically forbidden uses.286
Senator David B. McBride opened debate on S.B. 221.287 Unlike S.B.
217, Senator McBride noted that S.B. 221 was a "direct response" to
Kelo.288 The intent, he announced, was to protect private property from
business interests. 289 The Senator, however, expected that S.B. 221 would
achieve this goal without drastically changing the law, but rather by
clarifying and strengthening existing law.290
Echoing his thoughtful question about S.B. 217, Senator Amick
jumped right to the substance of the Bill and asked Senator McBride to
explain what "immediate and direct benefit" meant and what would result
from the requirement that "those from whom the property is being taken"
must benefit from the condemnation. 29' Legislative Counsel Tim Willard
came to the floor to help answer questions about the Bill's specific
language.292 Willard avoided the first question but answered that the
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.

283. Id.
284. S.Amend. I to S.B. 221, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005); S.Amend. 2 to S.B.
221, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005).
285. S.B. 221 Amend. 1.
286. S.B. 221 Amend. 2.
287. Audio tape: Senate Debate on S.B. 221, 143d Gen. Assemb. (June 29, 2005) [hereinafter
S.B.221 Debate] (on file with author and available from the Delaware General Assembly).
288. Id.(statement of Senator David B. McBride).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.(statement of Senator Amick).
292. Id.
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individual from whom the property is being taken must benefit "as a
member of the public.

'293

Senator Amick then questioned whether

everybody must benefit equally from the taking.294 The intent of the
language, explained Willard, is only to demonstrate that the owner should
be considered--equality is not required.295
When Senator McDowell took the floor, his question addressed what
was left out of the bill.296 The Senator questioned how the measure would
change the law with regard to slum clearance and, if slum clearance would
still be an approved public use, how the bill would assure a fair definition
of "blight., 297 Most importantly, thought the Senator, was a measure to
prevent a town from defining "blight" as any home that does not have a
"two-car garage, central air, and three bedrooms." 298 Senator McDowell
explained that his concern with Kelo was the Court's overbroad definition
of "blight., 299 That is to say, Senator McDowell (demonstrating some
unfamiliarity with the case) believed that the project in Kelo was permitted
on grounds that the homes being condemned were blighted or otherwise
property of "slum landlords.,, 300 However, his misunderstanding was never
cleared up and his question was never answered.3 °' Instead, the debate
turned quickly to two pending amendments, both of which were approved,
and then to a vote on the amended Bill, which, of course, was also
approved, twenty-one to zero.30 2 Following its unanimous approval, S.B.
221 was moved to the House, but has yet so see action in that chamber.3 3
C. House ConcurrentResolution 38
The third measure taken by the general assembly in response to Kelo is
just the beginning of more legislation. Delaware House Concurrent
Resolution (H.C.R.) 38 has the intention of propagating even more postKelo legislation by creating a task force that will review the Supreme
Court's decision in that case and recommend altering Delaware's public use
law. 3°4
293. Id. (statement of Legislative Counsel Tim Willard).
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

id.(statement of Senator Amick).
Id. (statement of Legislative Counsel Tim Willard).
Id. (statement of Senator McDowell).
Id.
Id.
Id.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith Interview, supra note 5.
H.R. Con. Res. 38, 143d Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Del. 2005).
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The Resolution first construes the Kelo decision as one that allows
government to "take one person's private property for 'public benefit' in
the name of overall economic development., 30 5 Then the Resolution,
apparently in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court, states that the
United States Constitution
permits takings only for "public use," and not for
"public benefit. 30 6 Next, the Resolution asserts, "historically, eminent
domain has been used by government to take land to build government
facilities, such as forts, or to construct infrastructure, such as highways
which are open to all. 30 7 The Resolution then reaches a conclusion that
Kelo "greatly increases the potential for eminent domain abuse," and
specifies possible dangers such as taking "a person's private home or
business so that a larger business can make more money off that land and
pay more taxes as a result. ' 30 8 The possibility of using eminent domain to
increase the tax base, continues H.C.R. 38, "is the broadest and most
dangerous expansion of eminent domain," and Kelo removes "the
Constitution's protections [against such a dangerous expansion] out of
,,309
existence.
Given all the concerns stated in the Resolution, it concludes that the
general assembly must "protect the private land holdings of Delawareans
from government takings for the speculative real estate ventures of private
developers., 3'0 To achieve that end, a task force was created "to examine
and draft appropriate
State law that would restrict eminent domain to bona
311
fide public usage."
As for debate on the Resolution, H.C.R. 38 and its companion,
Delaware House Resolution 44, were introduced as resolutions to study the
decision in Kelo.312 No other information was given regarding either
measure; no one spoke on either Resolution and both were passed by voice
vote.313
As might314be expected, the House and Senate both passed H.C.R. 38
unanimously.
305.

Id.

306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Audio tape: House Debate on H.R. Con. Res. 38, 143d Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (June 30,
2005) [hereinafter H.C.R. 38 House Debate] (on file with author and available from the Delaware

General Assembly).
313. Id.
314. Audio tape: Senate Debate on H.R. Con. Res. 38, 143d Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (June
29, 2005) (on file with author and available from the Delaware General Assembly); H.C.R. 38 House
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IV. A WARNING TO STATES: ACCEPTING THIS INVITATION MAY BE
HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH (SAFETY AND PUBLIC WELFARE)

Delaware's post-Kelo legislation presents several interesting examples
of language limiting a state's exercise of eminent domain. This legislation
also presents serious questions about how the language will be interpreted
and how it will affect Delaware's public use case law. If the language of
any legislation is not carefully considered-especially when that legislation
is intended to change a complicated body of the common law-it may have
consequences well beyond the scope intended by the legislature. This Part
presents the most potent language in Delaware's legislation and then offers
analysis and remaining questions about that language by looking to the
federal and state jurisprudence on which the legislation, if enacted, would
rest. Ultimately, this Part will demonstrate that proposed measures may
prove to be, at best, unnecessary to undo the effects of Kelo and, at worst,
an inadvertent unraveling of a century of case law interpreting the public
use clause of Delaware's Constitution.
A. "Recognizedpublic use"
The insistence that property be taken "only for the purposes of a
recognized public use" begs the question: What is a "recognized public
use?" If case law is not the basis for this analysis, must a court look to
legislatively enumerated uses?
If case law is the touchstone for
determining recognized public uses, should the state courts look only to its
own law or also to federal law?
For the Delaware legislature to list each and every public use that it
saw as acceptable in a post-Kelo universe would be impractical. If it tried,
it would fail. No legislature could foresee every use that might be
necessary and acceptable. Such an effort could bring the activity of state
governments to a near standstill. Relying on case law for recognized public
uses will not create such drastic problems, but nonetheless may present
unintended consequences.
Federal courts have approved condemnation for any use that is within
the police power.315 Of course, the purpose of post-Kelo legislation is to
counteract the federal jurisprudence. Therefore, one might assume that
federal law is not the place to look for "recognized public use." Roads,
parking, slum clearance, prevention of beach erosion, and public parks have

Debate, supra note 312.
315. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
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all been specifically recognized by Delaware courts, for example. 1 6 If,
however, condemnation is limited to one of these "recognized public
use[s]," growth of the law will stop because condemnation for any other use
will be prohibited. The courts would never be permitted to advance the
law, contrary to the Delaware Supreme Court's assessment that "the
breadth of the concept of public purpose has increased and is increasing,
but it requires an extreme case for a court to say that it 'ought to be
diminished.' 31 7 Here, a legislaturehas said that it ought to be diminished.
There is no indication that the legislature intended to stop the growth of
the public use doctrine (as such an intention would be unwise), but only to
undo the effects of Kelo. Unfortunately, this language may accomplish the
former. No new uses can arise when a "recognized public use" is required.
B. "Immediateand direct benefit"
To be effective, language requiring that the public "realize an
immediate and direct benefit" from the exercise of eminent domain
must, at
3 18
least, give an indication of how to define "immediate" or "direct."
If "immediate" and "direct" are to be read in their most literal sense,
the government's ability to condemn property will be constrained beyond
the most basic expectations of takings for government buildings, schools,
reservoirs, and other uniformly accepted public uses. Arguably, for
example, taking land for a school does not provide a direct or an immediate
benefit. First, it must be clear that education alone is only a private benefit
to an individual. Education only provides a public benefit if the student is
able to enter the community at large and make use of what the school has
taught. Thus, the direct benefit of building a school is private edification.
The public benefit, whether it is an educated work force, educated voters, or
other public benefits from an educated community, is only an indirect
benefit. Moreover, that benefit cannot arise until long after private land has
been taken, a school has been constructed, and the pupils graduate.
Undoubtedly, this is not an immediate benefit.
The same logic applies to: (1) government buildings, where a
government agency will only provide services to limited segments of the
population but the services provided will indirectly create a more efficient
society; (2) roads, where the new road will only directly benefit those who
choose to drive it, but the indirect benefit of reduced traffic will benefit the
public at large; (3) reservoirs, where the increased water supply will not be
316. See supraPart II.
317. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614, 627 (Del. 1954) (emphasis added).
318. S.B. 221, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005).
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immediate because it will only be a benefit if there is a drought, and the
benefit will only directly apply to those who use the water source; and (4)
wetland mitigation, which is a direct environmental benefit, but is approved
because of its indirect benefit-its necessity for the building of roads.31 9
If the words "immediate" and "direct" are meant only to prevent more
attenuated uses such as those proffered in Kelo, they will still unduly limit
accepted uses of the eminent domain power. Economic development, the
legislature correctly assumes, is a risk. 320 Building new business will not
guarantee an increased tax base, and even if it did, the benefit would not be
achieved for many years after the actual property acquisition took place. If
this is all that a legislature seeks to prevent, the language is too broad.
Slum clearance, for example, as opposed to economic development, does
not rely on market forces to proceed. Structures are taken down by a
government mandate and the slum clearance project is complete. However,
the benefit of slum clearance, healthier and safer neighborhoods, will take
as long to come to fruition as the benefits of economic development
because, ultimately, it relies on the same forces of the marketplace.
Profitable businesses, high rates of employment, and other benefits of
economic development cannot be mandated, like the clearance of buildings,
by government decree.
The extent of the harm that the words "immediate and direct" may
cause is drastic. Aside from the aforementioned specific problems, an
"immediate and direct" clause may prevent a state from acquiring land for
any environmental protection. Environmental harms such as habitat loss or
wetland degradation rarely happen quickly. Thus, any attempt by a state to
condemn land for the purposes of environmental protection will show no
immediate benefits. Likewise, the benefits of healthy ecosystems are
quintessentially indirect. Human health and well-being depend on a healthy
environment, but the specific species being protected are the only direct
beneficiaries. Additionally, there is no indication in the legislation that the
new "safeguards" exempt takings of less than fee simple. That is to say,
even if a state sought only to gain an easement on certain land, the benefits
of that taking would need to be "immediate and direct."
Given the possible implication of this language-even beyond the
aforementioned examples--one can only hope that legislatures will not use
such a clause without definition, or at least, that courts will not strictly
interpret an "immediate and direct benefit" clause.

319. Cannon v. State, 807 A.2d 556, 559 (Del. 2002).
320. See S.B. 217 Senate Debate, supra note 254 (statement of Senator Venables) (explaining
that Kelo does not present a direct public use like roads or buildings).
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C. "Includingthosefrom whom the property is being taken"
Legislative insistence that benefits go to the "general public," which
"includ[es] those from whom the property is being taken," raises questions
about the role that a property owner plays in an eminent domain
proceeding. As Senator Amick queried, "if an owner says 'I don't get a
benefit from this condemnation, you are taking my home,' would that quash
the exercise of eminent domain? '32' Legislative Counsel Tim Willard did
concede, speaking only for the Delaware bill, of course, that the language
should not be interpreted to give the property owner veto power over the
taking.322 Rather, it was added to emphasize that the public and the owner,
as a member of the public, should benefit.323
Nonetheless, language directing a court's attention directly to the
property owner may insert the owner's interests into a proceeding to a
greater extent than the drafters of a piece of legislation intended, and
certainly more than is practicable. If the owner must benefit, even as a
member of the public, must a court take evidence on the costs and the
benefits to the owner before a condemnation can be approved? A similar
question is whether any benefit to the owner would be sufficient or whether
the costs to the owner would need to be considered before determining
whether the owner received an overall benefit. Surely, if a cost-benefit
analysis were conducted, most, if not all, owners of condemned land would
suffer more than they would benefit. Finally, legislation should make clear
that the owner's interests may be considered but an owner's subjective
interests cannot be determinative. Needless to say, any acquisition that
would be approved by the property owner would not be an exercise of
eminent domain at all, but a transaction on the open market.
Another complication of the "including those from whom the property
is being taken" clause is its relationship to the public use clauses of the
federal and state constitutions. Even if costs to a property owner outweigh
the benefits to that owner, that individual's interests cannot change the
constitutional character of the condemnation. If the purpose is otherwise a
public use, the cost to a homeowner cannot change the benefit that the
public is receiving. For example, if eminent domain is used to secure land
for a road, the road will be a public use, open to all and benefiting society at
large, even if the individual from whom the land was taken will ultimately
suffer as a result of the transaction.
In Delaware, legislative debate on S.B. 221 clearly identified the
321. S.B. 221 Debate, supra note 287 (statement of Senator Amick).
322. Id. (statement of Legislative Counsel Tim Willard).
323. Id.
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purpose of the "including those from whom the property is being taken"
clause.32 4 Nonetheless, the context of the language could lead to
misapplication of the clause by a court that did not delve into the legislative
history or a judge insisting on a strict construction of the language.
D. "May not include.., the re-development of currently occupied
residences and may not result in the displacement of the residents of the
property."
Prohibiting eminent domain if the taking would "re-develop[] ...
currently occupied residences" or "result in the displacement of the
residents of the property" 325 is an extreme measure. These clauses need
little discussion because it is painfully obvious how inhibiting these
requirements would be and because this language was removed from the
Delaware bill, 326 though the possibility of this language arising in another
state is far from remote. Whether a state intended to build a hospital, a
sports stadium, or a new home for the governor's top campaign contributor,
eminent domain could not be exercised unless the property taken was
vacant or the inhabitants of the property were allowed to remain on the land
when the project was completed. Thus, a conservation easement, taking
less than fee simple, would be acceptable, but the building of a reservoir
would not, unless that reservoir came with a houseboat for the residents of
the property or, if the reservoir were built, for example, in an abandoned
industrial park, which is probably not an ideal place to store millions of
gallons of public drinking water.
E. "Publicuse may include..."
"[P]ublic use may include the construction or maintenance of public
buildings, roads, schools, hospitals, railroads, reservoirs, and/or utilities. 3 27
This language clearly indicates that other public uses may exist. When
taken with the measure's earlier language, the other public uses clearly
must: (1) be a recognized public use; (2) be explained in a detailed
statement; (3) serve the general public, "including those from whom the
property is being taken;" and (4) provide an "immediate and direct
benefit., 328 The question, however, is whether the state must show that this
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. (statement of Senator McBride).
S.B. 221, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005).
S. Amend. 2 to S.B. 221, 143d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 2005).
S.B. 221.
Id.
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criterion is met when the proposed use is enumerated.
If permissible public uses are enumerated, there should be a
presumption that those uses meet the criteria provided by the legislature.
When a judge in a condemnation proceeding is presented with a statement
of public use announcing that property is to be taken for a public school, a
state might cite a bill similar to S.B. 221, and the judge may summarily
decide that because the bill explicitly declares schools to be a public use,
the condemnation may proceed.
If a hearing were held on the school project, however, the court might
follow the line of reasoning presented in Part IV.B. The court might then
determine that the school does not provide an immediate or a direct benefit.
Yet, "school[]" is specifically enumerated in the language of the bill.32 9
The question becomes whether the inclusion of schools, because they are
listed but do not strictly meet the requirements, would force a less
restrictive interpretation of the "immediate and direct benefit" language.
The probable answer is that the conflicting character of "schools" would
change the plain meaning of "immediate and direct benefit" because
interpreting language will always be something of a guessing game, but the
language, "public use may include the construction or maintenance of...
schools," leaves little room for misunderstanding.33 °
F. "Public use... may not include..."
Explicitly prohibiting public uses may also create more problems than
it will solve. Take for example, a prohibition on "revenue generation" and
"economic development., 33' Both are clearly enumerated in Delaware (as
they probably would be in any state) to shut out any Kelo-type projects.332
This clause raises two issues.
First, what constitutes "economic
development"? Second, if a proposed project met all of the requirements of
the new bills, and all the requirements of the case law, but also served an
economic purpose or generated tax revenue, would it be approved?
Revenue generation, understood in light of Kelo, is simply increasing
the tax base.333 Economic development, however, is not as easily defined.
The redevelopment effort in Kelo was economic development according to

329. Id.
330. See id.
(requiring that a public use allow "members of the general public ...[to] realize an
immediate and direct benefit").
331. Id.
332. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (posing the legal issue as
whether economic development is a legitimate public use).
333. Id.at 472.
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the United States Supreme Court, but it is only one example.3 34 What else
constitutes economic development for the purposes of post-Kelo
legislation? State legislatures should provide a clear statutory definition. In
Delaware, for example, S.B. 221 gives no definition. 335 Likewise, the
Delaware Code provides no definition of "economic development" besides
a newly added provision in an irrelevant subchapter dealing with charitable
business activities.336 Certainly, the general assembly would not have
based S.B. 221 off of this obscure reference without indicating as much.
Furthermore, this definition is in a title wholly unrelated to redevelopment,
land use, or eminent domain, so a court would be unlikely to search there
for direction on how to interpret S.B. 221. Clearly a project such as the
New London redevelopment plan would be unacceptable economic
development under any Kelo-responsive legislation. But perhaps the
building of an office for the state agency known as the Delaware Economic
Development Office would be acceptable. Without a clear definition of
"economic development," state courts will be faced with the difficult task
of developing coherent jurisprudence without coherent guidance from state
legislatures.
If, for example, the state seeks to implement a Randolph-type slumclearance project that will raze a particular area and then allow for
redevelopment that will be safer for the community, will the subsequent
redevelopment constitute "economic development"? 337 If the state seeks to
build another school, the educated graduates will help the economy, will
earn higher incomes, and, therefore, pay higher taxes. Will this economic
development and revenue generation prohibit the use of eminent domain for
school construction?
A prohibition on economic development or revenue generation might
bar a host of uses that are otherwise acceptable under the new bills.
Randolph saw corollary economic development as a necessary afterthought
to slum clearance, which served the public health and welfare. 338 Ranken
permitted revenue-generating tactics that supported a parking project,
which, on its own, constituted a public use. 33 9 Both of these projects would
probably be prohibited because they "include revenue generation [or]

334. Id.at 484 ("[Tlhe City has invoked a state statute that specifically authorizes the use of
eminent domain to promote economic development.").
335. S.B. 221.
336. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2002 (2004).
337. See generally Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139 A.2d 476 (Del. 1958) (mandating
slum clearance be followed by a redevelopment effort).
338. Id.at 483.
339. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614,630 (Del. 1954).
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economic development. 34 ° The language of S.B 221 clearly prohibits
revenue generation or economic redevelopment as a primary public use.34 1
There is no indication, however, that revenue generation may be acceptable
as a secondary purpose, and in fact, the language "may not include"
supports the idea that even as a secondary purpose, if revenue generation of
economic development is included in a plan, the plan cannot be a public
use. 342 Any state legislation should clearly define the relationship of
''revenue generation" and "economic development" to the proposed public
project.
Without clear legislative explanation, this type of language prohibits
the efficient operation of state government. By prohibiting any public
project that may involve economic development or revenue generation, this
language will shift the burden for many state projects from private
beneficiaries to taxpayers by prohibiting an agency from generating non-tax
income to support a public project. In an effort to directly attack Kelo-type
activity, this language will undeservedly prohibit uses that the legislators
who supported the bill would have approved of but simply overlooked in
their post-Kelo haste.
CONCLUSION

In one sense, it was very polite of Delaware to respond so quickly to
the Supreme Court's invitation. Delaware is certainly taking the Court's
suggestion and trying to revert its public use doctrine to a time before Kelo.
In another sense, the Delaware General Assembly might be a bit
overzealous. The acceptance will not only take the jurisprudence back to a
point before Kelo, but to somewhere near the point it was almost a century
ago-in 1912-when Clendaniel was decided.343 This is an obvious
consequence of reactive legislation crafted with a political, rather than
legal, goal in mind.
In this way, Delaware's measures generally
demonstrate problems that might arise in other states if their lawmakers do
not take more care.
Another problem with the general assembly's over-enthusiastic
response will be the redundancy of the outcome. Delaware, it seems, was
throwing its own party long before the United States Supreme Court

340. S.B. 221.
341. 1d.
342. Cf id. (noting that a public use "may not include revenue generation" or "economic
development").
343. See Clendaniel v. Conrad, 83 A. 1036, 1044 (Del. 1912) (holding that a private benefit of
revenue generation could not spoil a project that otherwise produced a public benefit).
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decided to throw a bigger one. Delaware courts interpreted the Delaware
Constitution to prohibit the kind of takings that were permitted by Kelo
when the Randolph court implied that economic redevelopment, on its own,
was not an acceptable public use, and when the court in Libby's Case
intensely scrutinized the government's motives. 3 " Of course, it would be a
social (read: political)faux pas to reject such a prestigious invitation. So,
even though there were still drinks to be had, the general assembly left
Delaware's party and headed over to the Supreme Court's, which might
turn out to be a bore. Other states should not make the same mistake.
Notably, with regard to the post-Kelo uproar, "[t]he issue is not
whether governments can condemn private property to build a public
amenity like a road, a school or a sewage treatment plant. 3 4 Certainly,
this was not the issue in Delaware either, but as has been demonstrated in
this Note, careless legislation may make it a problem.
Delaware
lawmakers, "in their zeal to protect homeowners and small businesses,
[will] handcuff local governments" not only from prohibiting Kelo-type
development but also from carrying out
basic government projects that,
346
question.
in
been
rarely
have
now,
until
Delaware is a perfect example and caution. Professor Echeverria,
director of the Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute, has
admonished that "many states are on the verge of seriously overreacting to
the Kelo decision., 347 Professor Echeverria continues: "The danger is that
some legislators are going to attempt to destroy what is a significant and
sometimes painful but essential power., 348 Delaware's experience indicates
that legislators are not "attempting" to destroy this power but are
inadvertently "handcuffing" state and local governments. Delaware is a
clear example that states must first look to their own eminent domain
jurisprudence and determine whether it needs to be changed. Only then can
states decide if a legislative fix is necessary. Finally, in crafting a
legislative response, words must be carefully chosen so that they effect only
the desired changes.

344. See Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth. 139 A.2d 476, 483 (Del. 1958) (approving a
redevelopment plan only because the primary purpose was slum clearance); see also Libby Opinion, 521
A.2d 227, 229-31 (Del. 1986) (scrutinizing the motives behind the Wilmington Parking Authority's
planned parking project).
345. Broder, supranote 4.
346. Id.
347. Id.(italics added).
348. Id.
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Meanwhile, down the street, Delaware's neighbor watched her with
embarrassment. "Why doesn't she look at the invitation closely, see why
the party is being held and what is expected of her?" Her neighbor could
not believe the haste with which Delaware was operating. Though the
neighbor knew that Delaware might be wasting time and money, at least her
mistakes could be carefully watched and learned from so that they would
not be made again.
Joshua U Galperint
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